



Probing Privacy Leakage in Large Language Models

Siwon Kim^{1,*}

Sangdoon Yun³

Hwaran Lee³

Martin Gubri^{4,5}

Sungroh Yoon^{1,2,†}

Seong Joon Oh^{5,6,†}

¹ Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Seoul National University

² Interdisciplinary Program in Artificial Intelligence, Seoul National University

³ NAVER AI Lab ⁴ University of Luxembourg ⁵ Parameter Lab

⁶ Tübingen AI Center, University of Tübingen

Research Question

Social media



Trains



Large Language Model

LLaMA
by  **Meta**

Bard





Was my personal data included as well?



Linkable PII Leakage

Large models are known to memorize training examples, and they can be leaked



Training Set



Caption: Living in the light with Ann Graham Lotz

Generated Image



Prompt: Ann Graham Lotz

Training data leakage in LLM_[1]

Training data leakage in Stable Diffusion_[2]

What about my personally identifiable information (PII)...?

[1] Carlini, Nicholas, et al. "Extracting training data from large language models." USENIX Security 2021

[2] Carlini, Nicolas, et al. "Extracting training data from diffusion models." USENIX Security 2023

PII: Personally Identifiable Information

Data subject



List of PII

Name	Jane Doe
Email	j.doe@abc.com
Phone	999-159-2653
Address	XYZ street 123 ...
Job	Professor
Affiliation	ABC University
	...

Linkable PII Leakage

A privacy leak is more severe if the PII is linked to the data subject

Definition of a **linkable PII leakage**:

- PII of a data subject $\mathcal{A} := \{a_1, \dots, a_M\}$
- Linkable PII leakage is exposed if

$$\Pr(a_m | \mathcal{A}_{\setminus m}) > \Pr(a_m), \quad \mathcal{A}_{\setminus m} = \{a_1, \dots, a_{m-1}, a_{m+1}, \dots, a_M\}$$

ProPILE: Privacy Probing Tool For LLMs


Online activity

Data subject



List of PII


Name	Jane Doe
Email	j.doe@abc.com
Phone	999-159-2653
Address	XYZ street 123 ...
Job	Professor
Affiliation	ABC University
	...



Web crawling
w/o consent



ProPILE: Privacy Probing Tool For LLMs



1) **Black-box probing** for general users & 2) **White-box probing** for LLM providers

Experimental Setup

- Models: OPT 350M/1.3B/2.7B/6.7B
- Evaluation dataset: Curated PII triplets from the PILE dataset
 - Name
 - Phone number
 - Email address
- OPT models are trained on the PILE dataset

[1] Zhang, Susan, et al. "Opt: Open pre-trained transformer language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.01068 (2022).

[2] Gao, Leo, et al. "The pile: An 800gb dataset of diverse text for language modeling." arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.00027 (2020).


Leakage Does Occur – Likelihood

Likelihood-based


- Reconstruction likelihood from LLM

$$\Pr(a_m | \mathcal{A}_m) = \prod_{r=1}^{L_r} p(a_{m,r} | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{L_q+r-1})$$

- **NULL** : random PII
- **Reconstruction**: true target PII



Leakage Does Occur – String Match




Leakage worsens as

- More queries (number of prompts)
- More association level
- Larger model

White-box Probing


- Soft prompt tuning to maximize the leakage
- For probing in-house LLMs
- Prepend soft tokens to black-box prompts




$$\theta_s^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta_s} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A} \sim \tilde{\mathcal{D}}} [-\log(\Pr(a_m | [\theta_s; X_e]))]$$

Leakage can be Increased by White-box Probing


(a) Number of training data



(b) Number of soft tokens



(c) Initialization type



Leakage worsens as

- More training data
- More number of soft tokens
- Different initialization type

Try it Yourself! – Demo Page

<https://staging.parameterlab.de/research/propile>

Research > Personally Identifiable Information

ProPILE: Probing Privacy Leakage in Large Language Models Copy URL

Authentication mode

Personalized Mode
You will receive a detailed report on the exposure risk of your personal information in the LLM. You need to be logged in.

Anonymous Mode
You will receive a simple summary of the exposure risk of your personal information in the LLM.

Your name

Your email

Your phone number

I consent to the use of my personal information.
Your personal information will not be stored on our server.

I agree to receive the report via email provided.
We send you the report to your email.

Inference mode

Name & Email → Phone

Name & Phone → Email

Phone & Email → Name

Test

Partial Conclusion

- LLM can leak Personally Identifiable Information
 - LLMs are trained on personal data from the web
 - LLMs can link PII to a data subject
 - LLMs create privacy risk across websites
- We propose ProPILE
 - To probe your own PII leakage
 - For LLM providers to probe privacy leakage