🕵ProPILE🕵
Probing Privacy Leakage in Large Language Models

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Research Question

Social media

Trains

Large Language Model

LLaMA by Meta

Bard

Was my personal data included as well? 🕵️

Linkable PII Leakage

Large models are known to memorize training examples, and they can be leaked



Training data leakage in LLM[1]

Training data leakage in Stable Diffusion[2]

What about my personally identifiable information (PII)...?

[1] Carlini, Nicholas, et al. "Extracting training data from large language models." USENIX Security 2021
[2] Carlini, Nicolas, et al. "Extracting training data from diffusion models." USENIX Security 2023

PII: Personally Identifiable Information

Data subject

List of PII

Name	Jane Doe
Email	j.doe@abc.com
Phone	999-159-2653
Address	XYZ street 123 ...
Job	Professor
Affiliation	ABC University

...

Linkable PII Leakage

A privacy leak is more severe if the PII is liked to the data subject

Definition of a **linkable PII leakage**:

- PII of a data subject $\mathcal{A} := \{a_1, ..., a_M\}$
- Linkable PII leakage is exposed if

$$\Pr(a_m|\mathcal{A}_{\setminus m}) > \Pr(a_m), \quad \mathcal{A}_{\setminus m} = \{a_1, \cdots, a_{m-1}, a_{m+1}, \cdots a_M\}$$

ProPILE: Privacy Probing Tool For LLMs

Online activity

Data subject

List of PII

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	...



Web crawling
w/o consent

ProPILE: Privacy Probing Tool For LLMs



1) **Black-box probing** for general users & 2) **White-box probing** for LLM providers

Experimental Setup

- Models: OPT 350M/1.3B/2.7B/6.7B
- Evaluation dataset: Curated PII triplets from the PILE dataset
  - Name
  - Phone number
  - Email address
- OPT models are trained on the PILE dataset

[1] Zhang, Susan, et al. "Opt: Open pre-trained transformer language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.01068 (2022).
[2] Gao, Leo, et al. "The pile: An 800gb dataset of diverse text for language modeling." arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.00027 (2020).

Leakage Does Occur – Likelihood

Likelihood-based

- Reconstruction likelihood from LLM

$$\Pr(a_m|\mathcal{A}_m) = \Pi_{r=1}^{L_r} p(a_{m,r}|x_1, x_2, \ldots x_{L_q+r-1})$$

- NULL : random PII
- Reconstruction: true target PII



Leakage Does Occur – String Match



Leakage worsens as

- More queries (number of prompts)
- More association level
- Larger model

White-box Probing

- Soft prompt tuning to maximize the leakage
- For probing in-house LLMs
- Prepend soft tokens to black-box prompts



$$\theta_s^* = \text{argmin}_{\theta_s} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A}\sim\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}}[-\log(\Pr(a_m|[\theta_s; X_e]))]$$

Leakage can be Increased by White-box Probing



Leakage worsens as

- More training data
- More number of soft tokens
- Different initialization type

Try it Yourself! – Demo Page

https://staging.parameterlab.de/research/propile



Partial Conclusion

- LLM can leak Personally Identifiable Information
  - LLMs are trained on personal data from the web
  - LLMs can link PII to a data subject

    $\rightarrow$ LLMs create privacy risk across websites
- We propose ProPILE
  - To probe your own PII leakage
  - For LLM providers to probe privacy leakage